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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Torts-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS AcT-GovERNMENT HELD TO STRICT
LIABILITY. In Long v. U.S.,' the complainant, a South Carolina farmer,
recovered $25,000 for injuries received from a mowing machine blade
which he was adjusting when his mule, attached to the machine, lurched
forward. It was alleged that the proximate cause of the injuries was
the negligent operation of a U.S. Army helicopter which flew at low
altitude over the field complainant was mowing, frightening the ani-
mal. The Government introduced evidence of written permission to
use the field for Army maneuvers, but this was held to be no defense.
In holding for the complainant, the District Court applied a South
Carolina statute which assigns strict liability for all damages resulting
from the flight of aircraft, regardless of negligence.
Recovery under the FTCA on the basis of strict liability has been
denied by virtually all of the courts confronted with the question in
the last ten years3 on the grounds that the Act, in requiring a "negli-
gent or wrongful act or omission," ' excludes liability without fault.
Ostensibly this view is supported by the Supreme Court's holding in
Dalehite v. U.S.,5 in which it was stated that the provisions of the
FTCA did not extend to absolute liability so as to hold the Govern-
ment for injuries and deaths resulting from its possession of dangerous
chemical fertilizer.' The case has been judged controlling, the opinion
of one authority being that further legislation probably will be required
before strict liability is imposed upon the United States. 7
1. 241 F.Supp. 286 (D. S.C. 1965). No appeal perfected.
2. The owner of every aircraft . . . is absolutely liable for injuries to persons or
property . . . whether such owner was negligent or not, unless the injury is caused
in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured or of the owner or bailee
of the property injured. 36 Code of Laws of South Carolina 220, § 2-6 (1952). This
act, known as the Uniform Aeronautics Act, codifies the former common-law status
of aviation as an ultra-hazardous activity.
3. See, for example, Barroll v. U.S., 135 F.Supp. 441, 448 (D. Md. 1955); Voytas v.
U.S., 256 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 1958); Stratton v. U.S., 213 F.Supp. 556, 560 (D. Tenn.
1962); U.S. v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 33 (10th Cir. 1965).
4. Subject to the provisions of Chapter 171 . . . the district courts . . . shall have ex-
clusive jurisdiction of civil actions or claims against the United States, for money dam-
ages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.CA. S 1346 (b) (1958).
5. 346 U.S. 15, 97 L.Ed. 1427, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953). This is the sole case in which the
Court has confronted directly the issue of strict liability under the FTCA.
6. Id. at 44.
7. Prosser, Torts, § 125, p. 1001, 3rd Ed. (1964).
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CURRENT DECISIONS
Development of the law in this area, however, has been conflicting.
Strict liability decisions against the Government were not uncommon
during the period between passage of the FTCA in 1946 and Dalehite
in 1953,8 nor did that decision bring about their complete cessation.
In the same year, in fact, the Dalehite doctrine was disregarded by the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Praylou,9 in which it was held that
a distinction must be made between strict liability of the Government
for deciding to possess dangerous property, as in the former case, and
liability under a strict liability statute ° for damage inflicted by Gov-
ernment employees, as in the latter. Under this construction, the Dale-
hite prohibition of strict liability under the FTCA may be limited to
injuries resulting from exercise of the planning or "discretionary"
function of government (as opposed to the operational function), an
area already expressly exempted from liability under the Act anyway."
In this connection it is significant that Praylou was cited with apparent
approval by the Supreme Court in Rayonier, Inc. v. U. S.,12 in which
this distinction was critical. Another hint that the Court was ready
to reconsider its previous decision came when certiorari was granted
in U.S. v. Taylor,3 a case following Dalehite, but settlement was
reached prior to determination.
Despite indications of accord by the highest tribunal, Praylou has
found no acceptance in the courts.' 4 Long v. U.S. is the first case since
1957 to rely on it in holding the United States strictly liable. As a
8. Boyce v. U.S., 93 F.Supp. 866 (D. Ia. 1950); U.S. v. Glaidys, 194 F.2d 762 (loth
Cir. 1952); Parcell v. U.S., 104 F.Supp. 110 (D. W.Va. 1952).
9. 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953) cert. denied, 347 US. 934. (Government held strictly
liable for its airplane crashing, inflicting injuries on persons and property.) "To say
that the Tort Claims Act was not intended to cover a liability arising from the pos-
session of dangerous property by the government is a very different thing from
saying that it was not intended to apply to a liability for damage inflicted by govern-
ment employees merely because the law of a state imposes absolute liability for such
damage and not mere liability for negligence."
10. Supra note 2.
11. The provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this tide shall not apply
to (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (a) (1964).
12. 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957). (Justices Reed and Clark dissented, citing Dalehite.)
13. 236 F.2d 649 (1956).
14. Accord: Hahn v. US. Airlines, 127 F.Supp. 951 (D. N.Y. 1954); Pendergast v.
U.S. 241 F.2d 687 (4th Cir. 1957).
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result of the decision, however, attention is again focused on the argu-
ments in favor of the holding.
As contended by the petitioners in Dalehite, narrow interpretation
of the words "negligent or wrongful act" in the FTCA' so as to
exclude injuries for which local law imposes liability contravenes the
intent of the Supreme Court that the Act be construed liberally,1" and
negates the logical meaning of Section 1346, which states that the
United States will be liable to the same extent as a private personY.7 It
was urged that it was a safe inference of legislative intent to read the
words "negligent" and "wrongful," stated in the disjunctive, as not
synonymous, the second word encompassing the concept of wrongful-
ness by dint of statute. Other Dalehite critics18 believe that had ex-
clusion of strict liability been the design, it could easily have been
included in the FTCA's numerous express exemptions. 9
The present case may be a preview if not a precedent. Should the
Fourth Circuit, in which lies Virginia, again become a testing ground
for this line of reasoning, a holding in accord therewith is not improb-
able.2
Richard A. Repp
Taxation-DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE IN YEAR OF DISPOSITION ON
ASSET SOLD AT A GAIN.
In Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' the
taxpayer had purchased a used Liberty ship on December 21, 1955, for
$469,000, and thereafter computed its depreciation thereon over a useful
life of three years using the straight line method with an estimated salvage
value of $54,000. The Internal Revenue Service had advised the tax-
payer in a letter ruling prior to the acquisition that it would accept a
three year life, subject to change if warranted by subsequent experience,
15. Supra note 4.
16. U.S. v. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. 543 (1951); U.S. v. Aetna Casualty, 338 U.S. 366
(1949).
17. Supra note 4.
18. See Jacoby, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 Fed. Bar
J. 139 (1964).
19. 28 US.C.A. § 2680 (1964).
20. Note: Two of the three strict liability decisions between Dalehite and Long were
in the Fourth Circuit. United States v. Praylou, supra note 9; Pendergast v. U.S.,
supra note 14. Cf. Medlin v. U.S., 244 F.Supp. 403, 406 (D. S.C. 1965).
1. 86 S.Ct. 862 (1966).
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